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Abstract: With the rise of experimental philosophy in the twenty-first century, the past two decades 
have witnessed the experimental turn in the field of philosophy of language. We delineate in this 
paper the experimental turn in philosophy of language before distinguishing armchair theorizing 
from empirical testing and highlighting the complementarity between the two approaches, and then 
carry out an analysis of the experimental tools and methods available for philosophical experiments 
with examples by classifying them into three major types, viz., the method of survey, the method of 
big data, and the method of cognitive neuroscience.
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1. Introduction 
The fundamental research method of philosophers of language is linguistic or conceptual 
analysis, that is, to carry out an in-depth analysis and elucidation of concepts through linguistic and 
logical analysis. From the perspective of philosophers of language, quite a number of philosophical 
puzzles can be ascribed to the obscurity of concepts, and hence they advocate conceptual analysis 
by means of thought experiments and by bringing up counter-examples. Dennett (1980) coined the 
term “intuition pump” to vividly describe what a thought experiment is and how it works—to pump 
(or elicit) one’s intuition regarding a philosophical proposition or problem with hypothetical cases. 
However, there is no doubt that the reliability of intuition itself is dubious. As philosophers make a 
claim by using “people would say (in this situation)”, “intuitively”, or “ordinarily”, they argue by 
appealing to their (own) intuitions. But how can we make sure that a theory or a thesis is plausible 
and well-founded if only a dozen of philosophers claim such and such out of intuition? With its 
initial aim to empirically test the reliability and generality of intuition, experimental philosophy 
(often abbreviated as X-Phi) has developed since the turn of the twenty-first century and is gaining 
momentum. Experimental philosophers adopt the experimental methods typically used in social 
psychology and cognitive science to investigate questions of philosophical interest and make an 
attempt to justify or falsify the theoretical claims and hypotheses made by traditional philosophers 
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with empirical evidence. 
Since its emergence at the beginning of this century with the groundbreaking work of Weinberg 
et al. (2001), Nichols et al. (2003) and Machery et al. (2004), the approach of experimental 
philosophy has been adopted in many fields of philosophy, including not only philosophy of 
language, but also epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of economics, and others. 
It also needs to be noted that this new philosophical movement has greatly contributed to the 
rethinking and reexamination of metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology. Many traditional 
philosophers might not readily accept the experimental approach, but the influential work and 
achievements of experimental philosophers should never be ignored. With the rapid development 
of experimental philosophy, experimental semantics and pragmatics, experimental philosophy 
of language is also gaining in popularity in the past two decades, with its main topics including 
(empirical tests of) the reference of proper names and natural kind terms, Kripke’s Gödel case, 
the context-sensitivity of “knows” (knowledge), transparent ascriptions, etc. The unprecedented 
important role that experimentation plays in the study of philosophy of language and the emergence 
of an abundance of experimental research in philosophy of language both indicate that philosophy of 
language is taking an experimental turn. This, however, never means that the experimental approach 
will take place of conceptual and linguistic analysis, but simply that experimental philosophy has 
provided philosophers with an indispensable and useful toolkit, thus ensuring a higher validity and 
reliability of philosophical studies if they make good use of the experimental methods. In this paper 
we will first explain the distinction between armchair theorizing and empirical testing and their 
complementarity before illustrating three kinds of experimental tools available to philosophers, viz., 
the method of survey, the method of big data, and the method of cognitive neuroscience.
2. Armchair theorizing vs. empirical testing
Ever since the age of Plato, the appeal to intuition has been an essential, if not the only, source of 
evidence in doing philosophy. Philosophers generally see consistency/inconsistency with intuition 
as the default standard in making judgments about the reliability and acceptability of a theory or 
an argument. For philosophers of language, the major work they are engaged in over the years is 
conceptual analysis, and a common way to do conceptual analysis is to devise real or imagined 
cases (thought experiments) and to make intuitive judgments about the truth value or acceptability 
of some proposition of philosophical interest in the cases, on the basis of which arguments are 
developed, justified, or falsified. People may wonder where these intuitive judgments come 
from? Generally speaking, they are from themselves. As the traditional or typical way analytic 
philosophers theorize is through linguistic and logical analysis (which we can carry out all in an 
armchair with no need to go out to conduct experiments), traditional analytic philosophy was given 
a “nickname”—“Armchair Philosophy” (“AP” hereafter), contrasted with experimental philosophy. 
Experimental philosophers cast doubt on the reliability of intuition on which armchair philosophers 
rely in theorizing by the “Argument from Variation”, which goes like this:
1) Experimental studies have shown that intuitions vary as a function of inappropriate factors like 
cultural background, emotional state, and so forth.
2) The above variation shows intuition to be an unreliable guide to philosophical truth.
Zhou and Gao 
21Forum for Linguistic Studies (2020) Volume 2, Issue 1
3) Philosophers must abandon their reliance on intuition-based methods of theorizing. (Nado, 
2016: 1–2)
It should be noted, however, that the Argument from Variation stands only if the traditional 
philosophers’ method of philosophizing is really intuition-based. However, some analytic 
philosophers like Cappelen and Ichikawa have argued against the centrality of intuition by claiming 
that it is not intuition, but facts about philosophical phenomena which constitute the basis of 
evidence in philosophy (see Cappelen, 2012; Deutsch, 2009, 2010; Ichikawa and Jarvis, 2013; 
Ichikawa, 2014). But the real fact could be that facts and arguments are both intuition-related. 
Hence both intuitions and facts are supposed to come under empirical scrutiny.
As a matter of fact, conceptual analysis and empirical testing complement each other and should 
be combined in use in philosophical studies. Conceptual analysis and argumentation are never the 
privilege of philosophers. Likewise, experimentation is not the privilege of scientists, either. As 
Kornblith claims, “When philosophical theories in epistemology are constructed from the armchair, 
they run a serious risk of being divorced from the very phenomena they seek to illuminate. The 
only way to assure that we do not build elaborate castles in the air, unconnected to the real world 
phenomena which motivate our work in the first place, is to base our work on the best available 
experimental understanding of those phenomena.” (Kornblith, 2014: 207) Arguably the rise of 
experimental philosophy symbolizes the return of the tradition of the continuity of philosophy and 
science. We agree with Papineau that philosophy is like science in several ways. First, the claims 
made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, 
not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support 
as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than 
necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed at understanding the actual world studied by science, not 
some further realm of metaphysical modality. (Papineau, 2014) The continuity of philosophy and 
science is clearly reflected by the fact that a variety of sub-disciplines with the form of “philosophy 
of X” have well developed since the twentieth century, such as the philosophy of science, the 
philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of cognitive science, and 
the philosophy of information. If philosophy is consistent with science and can benefit from 
experimentation in a real sense, we would not have any reason to reject the available experimental 
methods of cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience.
3. The methodology for experimental philosophy
Experimental philosophers do not have their own methodology, but they have borrowed in their 
research a wide variety of experimental tools and methods from social psychology and cognitive 
science. The most commonly adopted method in experimental philosophy has been questionnaire 
survey, which is used to elicit folk intuitive judgments about questions or propositions in devised 
cases. Nevertheless, it has been realized that survey is only one of the experimental tools available 
to philosophers, and there are still many different types of experimental methods available for 
philosophical investigations, such as corpus analysis, eye-tracking, VR technology, and fMRI. Ever 
since the beginning of this century, a number of philosophy laboratories have been established at 
world-renowned universities, such as the Experimental Philosophy Laboratory at the University 
of California at San Diego, the Experimental Philosophy Laboratory at Yale University and 
The experimental turn in philosophy of language
22 Forum for Linguistic Studies (2020) Volume 2, Issue 1
the University of Arizona, the Experimental Epistemology Laboratory at Indiana University, 
Experimental Epistemology Research Group at University at Buffalo, the State University of New 
York, Pittsburgh Empirical Philosophy Lab at the University of Pittsburgh, to name but a few. 
We classify the experimental methods applicable to philosophical experiments into three major 
types, viz., the method of survey, the method of big data, and the method of cognitive neuroscience. 
The method of survey is typically used to conduct behavioral and psychological experiments. By 
using the method of big data, we can collect data of real linguistic and conceptual use as empirical 
evidence for theoretical arguments. By adopting the method of cognitive neuroscience, data of brain 
activities can be precisely tracked with the aid of sophisticated equipment. Despite the wide range 
of experimental tools available, experimental philosophers have not broaden their use of the toolkit 
in their philosophical studies until the past decade or so. We will elaborate on these three types of 
experimental methods with specific cases of experimental studies of philosophy in the following 
sections.
3.1. The method of survey
The method of survey in social psychology has been the most commonly used method in 
experimental philosophy studies. With the aim to test the reliability of philosophers’ intuition-
based claims, researchers devise imagined cases and let the subjects make intuitive judgments 
on questions concerning some philosophical concept, usually by using a Likert scale. The survey 
method has the following characteristics: Firstly, it has a close relation to thought experiments in 
that many experimental cases adopted in survey studies are classic thought experiments, like the 
Gettier cases in Starmans and Friedman (2012) and the fake-barn cases in Colaço et al. (2014). 
Secondly, compared with other kinds of experiments that rely on sophisticated experimental 
instruments, it is simpler and more convenient to carry out a survey. The main procedures for 
conducting a survey are to propose a research question, make an assumption, devise cases, design 
the questionnaire, implement it, collect data, and analyze the results. The most critical and difficult 
part of an experimental study must be experimental design. Let’s take a look at the pioneering work 
in experimental philosophy by Weinberg et al. (2001). 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Jonathan Weinberg and his colleagues conducted a 
groundbreaking experimental investigation into the cultural variation in epistemic intuitions. 
Considering that Nisbett (2001) demonstrates that there are differences in belief forming strategies 
in different cultural groups, Weinberg then tries to explore the possible differences in epistemic 
intuitions in different cultural groups. He put forward four hypotheses: 1) Epistemic intuitions vary 
from culture to culture; 2) Epistemic intuitions vary from one socioeconomic group to another; 
3) Epistemic intuitions vary as a function of how many philosophy courses a person has had; 4) 
Epistemic intuitions depend, in part, on the order in which cases are presented. Three versions 
of Truetemp cases (the Individualistic Version, the Elders Version, and the Faluki Version) were 
designed to explore externalist/internalist dimensions of the subjects’ intuitions in the surveys. Take 
a look at the individualistic version.
Individualistic Version: One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain 
becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature where 
he is. Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, 
this brain re-writing leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, 
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he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room. 
Does Charles really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it? (Weinberg, 
Nichols and Stich, 2001)
The subjects in this experiment (undergraduates at Rutgers University, East Asians and 
Westerners) are required to choose from whether “really knows” or “only believes” (that it is 
71 degrees). The results suggest that there exists a highly significant difference between East 
Asians and Westerners in the individualistic version, and there are no significant differences in 
the Elders version and the Faluki version. The research findings indicate that in the individualistic 
version Charles’ reliable mechanism is epistemically external. Therefore, the group who choose 
“only believes”’s folk epistemology may be internalist; in the elders version, the reliability of 
epistemological mechanism is social sanction; in the Faluki version, it is shared by everyone in 
the community. The results of this experiment confirmed their hypothesis that intuition is culture-
specific. 
Before and while conducting a survey study of philosophy, we should pay particular attention 
to the following few aspects. First, strict and effective control should be taken of all the possible 
disturbing variables in the process of experimental design. Second, presentation effects such as the 
ordering effect (the influence of the order in which the vignettes are presented) and the framing 
effect (influence of wording in particular) should be avoided. Third, the relationship of theory and 
experimental cases must be seriously considered and well handled. Though the cases (often called 
“vignettes” in X-Phi research) are used in a survey to collect data to justify or falsify a thesis or a 
theory, we should be careful to avoid theory-laden formulation of them in the experimental design. 
Finally, experimental cases and control cases should be well selected and matched. 
It should never be ignored that the method of survey also has some obvious deficiencies. First, 
the data we obtain from a questionnaire survey is not real language use or authentic use of the 
concept under investigation, but only participants’ intuitive judgments about a proposition or 
their intuitive response to a question in devised cases. Second, a relevant important problem is 
the validity of survey. We would not know (1) whether the participants have really understood the 
vignettes (though a common practice is to ask a comprehension question to check their reading after 
the presentation of each vignette) and (2) whether the judgment they give is a true report of what 
they think. Still another issue is that there are too many disturbing variables in a survey that might 
prove difficult to be avoided altogether. If the disturbing variables cannot be taken the best possible 
control of in experimental design, then the validity of a survey will be devaluated and challenged. 
Fortunately, the above-mentioned deficiencies of questionnaire survey can be offset by the adoption 
of other experimental methods available.
3.2. The method of big data
As Devitt (2014) argues, philosophers of language should rely more heavily on evidence 
from actual usage—both sentences from the corpus and those elicited in controlled experiments. 
Evidence from survey data are evidently participants’ intuitive judgments about questions and 
propositions rather than actual language use. To collect data of authentic language use, we need to 
appeal to the method of big data. Even though the big data technology is still in its early stage of 
development and application, it has provided a useful research approach for social scientists. The 
concept “Big Data” was first put forward by Fayyad in 1995. The primary function of the big data 
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method is data mining and its basic objectives are descriptive and predictive. The main techniques 
include classification, association analysis, cluster analysis and anomaly detection. There are four 
characteristics of Big Data, namely volume, variety, velocity and value (often abbreviated as “4V”). 
Compared with the survey method, the adoption of the method of big data enables us to provide 
huge amounts of data. The method of big data is closely related to computer science. For example, 
computational simulation experiment and corpus can be applied to empirical studies of philosophy. 
Devitt suggests the use of corpus both informally and scientifically gathered to study the theory 
of reference. One way to gather direct evidence is to look at the corpus of usage. (Devitt, 2012) 
Leonelli (2012) and Pietsch (2013) have discussed the function of big data in philosophy of science, 
but it should also be realized that big data can be equally well applied to X-Phi studies. Devitt (2012) 
demonstrated the application of corpus to philosophical study with an example. 
The ‘Godel’ vignette contains eight uses of the name ‘Godel’ (and one mention). Now consider 
the question: Who do these uses refer to? MMNS (short for Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich) 
are the authors of this vignette and there can be no doubt that these philosophers are fully competent 
with the name ‘Godel’. And the referent of this name out of the mouths of the fully competent is to 
the eminent logician who did in fact prove the incompleteness of arithmetic and spent many years 
at Princeton. So that is whom MMNS’s eight uses of the name in the vignette refer to. But then 
their use of the name in the following passage disconfirms the description theory: “Now suppose 
that Godel was not the author of this theorem. A man called ‘Schmidt’, whose body was found in 
Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question.” For, 
if MMNS’s use of ‘Godel’ refers to that eminent logician in virtue of their associating with it the 
description, ‘the prover of the incompleteness of arithmetic’, this passage is not something that 
MMNS would be disposed to say. They would not, in one and the same breath, both refer to Godel 
and suppose away the basis of that reference. Similarly, according to the theory that the reference of 
‘bachelor’ is determined partly by its association with ‘unmarried’, competent speakers would not 
be disposed to say: “Suppose that the bachelors in Iceland are married.” But here the description 
theory seems to survive because we would not be disposed to say this. (Devitt, 2012: 28)
This example shows how we may use corpora to help investigate a theory of reference. Hacquard 
and Wellwood (2012) carried out a corpus-based study on epistemic modals in English, with the aim 
of empirically investigating whether epistemics contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences 
they appear in. In a sense, the method of big data and the method of survey well complements 
each other, and the two experimental methods can provide intuition-based claims with important 
empirical evidence.
3.3. The method of cognitive neuroscience
Cognitive neuroscience aims to uncover the basis of the brain function of the mind and emotional 
activities. The study of cognitive neuroscience covers such research areas as the study of language, 
thinking, and intelligence, the relationship of language and the brain, the neural basis of language 
processing, etc. The experimental methods of cognitive neuroscience are also more and more 
extensively used in philosophical research, including brain wave, brain imaging, microelectrode, eye 
movement, ERP, and fMRI. A great merit of the neuroscientific method is that it is able to visualize 
brain activities. By recoding different material change, we are able to observe the physical images 
of specific parts of the brain carrying out advanced functional activities from outside the brain, 
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and study cognition from the way the brain works. Crutch and Warrington (2004) has conducted a 
neuroscientific experiment on the semantic organization of proper names.
The subject of this experiment is an old lady named AZ. A CT scan revealed a large cerebral 
infarction in the territory of the left middle cerebral artery involving the parietal, temporal and 
posterior frontal regions but sparing the basal ganglia. Influenced by the damage in the brain 
district, AZ’s naming abilities were severely impaired. The researchers designed seven experiments 
to investigate AZ’s semantic ability: 1) semantic distance effects in identification of person names; 
2) refractoriness in identification of person names; 3) spoken word-written word matching in the 
broad category of brand names; 4) verbal knowledge of person names; 5) semantic relatedness of 
historical figures; 6) is person knowledge organized by principles other than occupation? 7) does 
phonemic similarity influence the semantic organization of proper nouns? The results show that 
all of the procedures reported in this study have probed for the presence or absence of a semantic 
distance effect upon AZ’s response accuracy.
Greene et al. (2001) and Lindquist et al. (2012) adopted fMRI to study the engagement of 
emotion and the nature of emotion respectively. In a recent study, Diaz (2019) analyzed the 
possibilities of neuroimaging methods with the above two experimental studies as examples within 
the practice of experimental philosophy.
4. Conclusion 
We examined in this paper the experimental turn in philosophy of language by (1) analyzing the 
distinction between and complementarity of armchair theorizing (conceptual analysis in particular) 
and empirical testing (experimentation); (2) proposing that three types of experimental methods 
in social sciences and cognitive science are available to philosophers and have been adopted in 
philosophical investigations, that is, the method of survey, the method of big data, and the method 
of cognitive neuroscience. The growing popularity of experimental philosophy (and the use of “the 
experimental turn”) does not mean that experimental philosophy is to replace armchair philosophy, 
but that the former complements the latter by providing necessary empirical evidence. The rise 
of experimental philosophy symbolizes the return of the tradition of the continuity of philosophy 
and science and there will continue to be waves of more X-Phi studies with a wider variety of 
experimental tools and methods in the near future.
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